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Propositional Merging and Judgment Aggregation:
Two Compatible Approaches?
Patricia Everaere1 and Se´bastien Konieczny2 and Pierre Marquis3
Abstract. There are two theories of aggregation of logical formu-
lae: merging and judgment aggregation. In this work we investigate
the relationships between these theories; one of our objectives is to
point out some correspondences/discrepancies between the associ-
ated rationality properties.
1 INTRODUCTION
Merging [6, 5] is a way to aggregate contradictory belief bases (or
goal bases) coming from a group of agents, in order to obtain a col-
lective belief (or goal) base. Merging operators have been defined
and studied as an extension of AGM belief revision theory [4, 2].
Judgment aggregation (JA) has been introduced in political phi-
losophy and social choice theory [9, 8]. The aim of judgment aggre-
gation is to make collective yes/no judgments on several (possibly
logically related) issues, from the judgments given on each issue by
the members of a group.
Clearly enough, merging and JA do not coincide, since they do not
have the same inputs and outputs, as illustrated in the following fig-
ure. Thus, merging takes as input a profile of n propositional bases
Ki, a formula µ representing some integrity constraints on the result
of the merging process,4 and outputs an (aggregated/collective) base
∆(K1, . . . ,Kn) which implies µ. JA takes as input a profile P of n
individual judgments γi on a preset agendaX , i.e., a set ofm propo-
sitional formulae ϕk (considered as binary questions); a judgment γi
is a vector of m binary values, so that γi(ϕk) = 1 precisely when
agent i answer to ϕk is yes; JA outputs an (aggregated/collective)
judgment γ(P ) on the same agenda.5
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Accordingly, JA can be seen as an aggregation issue based on
partial information, i.e., the agents’ judgments on the questions ϕk
are available, only, while in a merging process, the whole bases are
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4 Integrity constraints are omitted in the figure (i.e., µ = >).
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considered. Thus, in order to compare both methods on a fair basis
w.r.t. the informational contents, one needs to consider every possible
query (or, equivalently, every interpretation) in the agenda.
For space reasons we do not provide a full formal background on
belief merging and judgment aggregation; the reader can refer to [6]
for belief merging and to [3] for judgment aggregation. The logical
properties we consider in the following are reported in these papers.
2 MERGING VS. JUDGMENT AGGREGATION
In the following we assume that the agenda X = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is
the set of all interpretations. The connection between merging and JA
illustrated on the previous figure takes advantage of a decision policy
pC which rules at the interpretation level the relationships between
any agent base Ki and the individual judgment γi of agent i on the
agenda, i.e. the answer γi(ωj) agent i provides to question ωj of the
agenda:
• pC(Ki) = γi such that γi(ωj) = 1 if ωj |= Ki and γi(ωj) = 0
otherwise.
We also define the inverse operation p−1 as follows: p−1C (γi) =
Ki such that the set of models [K] of K is {ωj | γi(ωj) = 1}.
Thanks to the decision policy pC we can associate a merging op-
erator ∆ with a resolute JA correspondence γ, and a resolute JA cor-
respondence γ with a merging operator ∆, as follows:
Definition 1 • Given an integrity constraint µ, a merging oper-
ator ∆ and a profile E = {K1, . . . ,Kn}, we note P =
{pC(K1), . . . , pC(Kn)} and we define ∀ω |= µ, γP (ω) = 1
iff ω |= ∆µ(E).
• Given a non-empty set of interpretations [µ], a resolute judgment
aggregation correspondence γ and a profile P = {γ1, . . . , γn}
of judgments on [µ], we note E = {p−1C (γ1), . . . , p−1C (γn)} and
[∆µ(E)] ={ω ∈ [µ] | γP (ω) = 1}.
An important question is to determine whether such a mapping
between ∆ and the corresponding γ preserves some rationality con-
ditions. We start with the standard IC postulates for merging:
(IC0) By construction of ∆, (IC0) is satisfied, and this postulate
does not impose any constraint on the corresponding γ.
(IC1) Proposition 1 ∆ satisfies (IC1) iff γ satisfies collective ra-
tionality.
(IC2) Let us define an additional property for JA methods, namely
consensuality:
Definition 2 A judgment profile P = (γ1, . . . , γn) is consensual
for a given agendaX = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}when there existsϕj such
that γi(ϕj) = 1 for all i.
Consensuality. γ satisfies consensuality iff for any agenda
X = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} and any consensual judgment profile P =
(γ1, . . . , γn) for it, we have γP (ϕj) = 1 iff γi(ϕj) = 1 for all i.
Proposition 2 ∆ satisfies (IC2) iff γ satisfies consensuality.
(IC3) Proposition 3 ∆ satisfies (IC3) iff γ satisfies anonymity.
(IC4) (IC4) is the only IC postulate for which we have only an
implication (and not an equivalence). This is because (IC4) con-
siders only the special case of two bases, whereas neutrality is
defined for more general profiles.
Proposition 4 If γ satisfies neutrality,6 then ∆ satisfies (IC4).
(IC5) Let us now define two additional properties for JA methods,
based on the consistency condition that exists for voting meth-
ods [12, 1]. They correspond respectively to properties (IC5) and
(IC6).
Weak consistency. For any two judgment profiles P =
(γ1, . . . , γn) and P ′ = (γ′1, . . . , γ′n) in the domain of γ and any
ϕ ∈ X , if γP (ϕ) = 1 and γP ′(ϕ) = 1, then γPunionsqP ′(ϕ) = 1.
Consistency. For any two judgment profiles P = (γ1, . . . , γn)
and P ′ = (γ′1, . . . , γ′n) in the domain of γ. If there is ϕ ∈ X , s.t.
for every γP (ϕ) = 1 and γP ′(ϕ) = 1, then for every ψ ∈ X , if
γPunionsqP ′(ψ) = 1 then γP (ψ) = 1 and γP ′(ψ) = 1.
Quite surprisingly these conditions have not been considered as
standard ones for JA methods (we are only aware of [7, 11] that
gives the consistency condition – named separability).
Proposition 5 ∆ satisfies (IC5) iff γ satisfies weak consistency
(IC6) Proposition 6 ∆ satisfies (IC6) iff γ satisfies consistency
(IC7) For (IC7) and (IC8) we need two additional properties for JA
methods. The first property is the translation in the JA setting of
the well-known Sen’s property α from social choice theory [10]
(also known as Chernoff Condition).
Sen’s property α. Let P be a judgment profile and X be an
agenda s.t. ϕ ∈ X and γP (ϕ) = 1 on X . Suppose ϕ ∈X ′ ⊂ X ,
then γP (ϕ) = 1 on X ′.
Proposition 7 ∆ satisfies (IC7) iff γ satisfies Sen’s property α.
(IC8) For (IC8) one needs the translation to JA of another property
due to Sen:
Sen’s property β. Let P be a judgment profile and X be an
agenda s.t. ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ X , γP (ϕ1) = 1 and γP (ϕ2) = 1 on X .
SupposeX ⊂ Y . Then γP (ϕ1) = 1 on Y iff γP (ϕ2) = 1 on Y .
Proposition 8 If γ satisfies Sen’s property α and Sen’s property
β, then ∆ satisfies (IC8). If ∆ satisfies (IC8), then γ satisfies Sen’s
property β.
Notice that there is no direct correspondence between (IC8) and
Sen’s property β, we need also Sen’s property α to obtain (IC8).
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 9 • If γ satisfies collective rationality, consensuality,
anonymity, neutrality, weak consistency, consistency, Sen’s prop-
erty α and Sen’s property β, then ∆ is an IC merging operator (it
satisfies (IC0-IC8)).
• If ∆ is an IC merging operator (it satisfies (IC0-IC8)), then γ sat-
isfies collective rationality, consensuality, anonymity, weak con-
sistency, consistency, Sen’s property α and Sen’s property β.
6 One considers here the standard notion of neutrality, and not the one defined
in [3].
Let us also stress that a JA operator cannot satisfy both consensu-
ality and majority preservation.
Proposition 10 Consensuality and majority preservation cannot be
satisfied together.
Surprisingly, unanimity and consensuality are not logically con-
nected:
Proposition 11 Consensuality does not imply unanimity and una-
nimity does not imply consensuality.
Now that the connections between the postulates satisfied by ∆
and those satisfied by the corresponding γ have been made precise,
a key question is to determine whether one can find existing JA op-
erators satisfying all JA postulates above. Interestingly, the answer is
positive: the ranked majority methods described in [3] do the job.7
Especially this is the case of the ranked majority judgment aggre-
gation methods γRM⊕ with ⊕ = Σ or ⊕ = leximax (or more
generally with any⊕ satisfying strict non-decreasingness) – all these
operators coincide when the agendaX is the set of all interpretations.
Proposition 12 For any ⊕ satisfying strict non-decreasingness,
γRM⊕ satisfies collective rationality, collective completeness,
anonymity, neutrality, unanimity, consensuality, weak consistency
and consistency, Sen’s properties α and β. It satisfies neither inde-
pendence nor majority preservation.
3 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have sketched some relationships between proposi-
tional merging operators and judgment aggregation ones in the full
information case (when the agenda contains all possible interpreta-
tions). We have also obtained some results in the general case, which
cannot be reported here but are left for the long version of this paper.
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